The Harsh Realities of Green Energy: Africa’s Resource Strain

The rush for battery metals risks echoing one of the most detrimental patterns in global economic history.

In June 2022, the European Parliament passed a measure to essentially prohibit the sale of new gasoline or diesel cars by 2035. If ratified by the European Union, this decision would drastically reshape the world’s third-largest automobile market, following China and the United States, accelerating the worldwide shift of the automotive industry towards battery technology.

What the parliamentarians failed to address is the staggering challenge of mining and refining the immense quantities of minerals essential for batteries—such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, palladium, and others—at a scale necessary for the rapid transition to electric vehicles (EVs). The unspoken truth of the green revolution lies in its relentless demand for resources from Africa and other regions, often produced through some of the world’s most polluting technologies. Moreover, the accelerated shift to batteries now poses the risk of perpetuating one of the most detrimental patterns in global economic history: the systematic extraction of raw materials from the global south, which enriched developed countries while leaving behind a legacy of environmental degradation, human rights abuses, and enduring underdevelopment throughout the developing world.

Certain nations are endeavoring to challenge this pattern and secure a larger portion of the wealth generated by the energy transition. Take Indonesia, for instance, which implemented a ban on the export of raw nickel ore in 2020, effectively compelling foreign firms to move their nickel processing operations to Indonesia. Nonetheless, numerous economists raise doubts about whether such bans genuinely foster development. In a fiercely competitive global market, these endeavors often encounter obstacles due to deficiencies in local expertise and logistical networks. Similarly, Bolivia has sought to enhance the value of its lithium reserves, albeit with underwhelming outcomes thus far.

However, the issue extends beyond mere economics. As battery metals assume strategic importance akin to the longstanding centrality of oil, it becomes exceedingly challenging for developing nations with substantial resources to prevent their developmental paths from being influenced by geopolitics. Few countries exemplify this dilemma as poignantly as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, home to the world’s largest known cobalt reserves—a metal crucial to the green transition, particularly due to its role in enabling electric vehicle batteries to achieve extended driving ranges between charges.

China’s focus on batteries as a component of its strategic industrial planning has caused concern in the United States. In May, the Biden administration unveiled a $3 billion initiative aimed at enhancing domestic EV battery production. However, for any endeavor to wrest control of a larger portion of the battery supply chain from China to be successful, U.S. manufacturers will require increased access to minerals like cobalt. Consequently, this has placed Congo—and Chinese operations there—under scrutiny from Washington.

Congo stands out among African nations. Its vast size, comparable to that of Western Europe, and abundant resources play a crucial role in shaping the economic prospects of the entire African continent. Any entity interested in Congo’s mineral wealth must confront the same challenges that hinder progress across the continent. Given Congo’s expansive dimensions, and central location in Africa with limited access to transportation hubs, any concerted effort to develop its resources would impact neighboring countries and establish precedents, both positive and negative, for the rest of the continent.

A crucial issue lies in the lack of cross-border infrastructure such as railways and access to seaports. This isn’t solely a requirement for bringing battery resources to market. The scarcity of cross-border infrastructure across much of Africa has also hindered efforts to integrate the continent’s economies, despite the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2018, which, on paper, is the world’s largest free trade zone, encompassing 43 states. China has made significant strides in this area, with Chinese-funded rail and port infrastructure projects transforming African logistics. In 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that 46 sub-Saharan African ports were either built, expanded, or operated by Chinese entities.

The combination of railway and port infrastructure holds significant potential. A notable example is the recent connection of the Atlantic Ocean port of Lobito in Angola to the southern border of Congo via a 1340-kilometer rail line. Additionally, several East African nations are vying for funding to link their Indian Ocean ports to eastern Congo. However, as various Chinese entities, each with diverse commercial and political agendas, concentrate on connecting resource-rich areas to the sea for shipment to China, they inadvertently perpetuate the resource extraction economy reminiscent of the colonial era on a broader scale. This situation places countries like Congo at risk of enduring underdevelopment. On a more optimistic note, once established, cross-border infrastructure could present alternative pathways for development, such as enhancing intra-African trade and fostering local manufacturing.

Chinese miners have faced allegations of exacerbating already substandard labor and environmental conditions, with substantial evidence of poor practices among Chinese entities in Congo. Moreover, Chinese companies have been sluggish in fulfilling commitments to infrastructure projects unrelated to the extraction economy, such as schools, hospitals, and other social infrastructure, which were included in major mineral deals.

Some perceive this as a chance for Western firms to supplant their Chinese rivals by forging agreements with Congo that prioritize development. In recent years, joint delegations comprising U.S. government officials and corporate executives, along with European groups, have visited Congo. However, there have been scant public declarations regarding tangible cooperation agreements.

Even if China were to face increased competition for favor in Congo, there’s no assurance that the energy transition wouldn’t trigger another scramble for African resources with minimal benefits for the majority of Africans. This is because the West hasn’t notably outperformed China. Western corporations, such as the Swiss mining and commodity trading company Glencore, have a lengthy and ongoing track record of human rights abuses and corruption in Congo. A brief examination of Western involvement in Congo, from Belgium’s appalling colonial rule to U.S. backing for the notoriously brutal and corrupt regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, makes it challenging to portray Chinese investors as uniquely detrimental among the foreign entities operating in Congo.

If anything, both China and the West are playing a similar game. In 2018, China Molybdenum collaborated with Western firms like Glencore and Ivanhoe Mines to resist a new mining code that boosted the Congolese government’s portion of mining royalties. The resulting struggle between the government and these companies led to a temporary suspension of China Molybdenum’s operations. However, the company enjoys influential allies within the government, which complicates any attempts to reform the country’s mining sector — assuming that’s even the government’s objective, given that Congolese politics are characterized by high levels of corruption and opacity.

The discourse in Washington often portrays Africa’s future prosperity as contingent on its choice of partners, with the United States depicted as the more environmentally responsible, transparent, and development-oriented actor. However, in reality, the United States and China may be much more aligned than this narrative suggests. Both countries prioritize the extraction of raw ore and, ideally, refining it domestically. While they might consider establishing more refining capacity in Congo if pressured, thereby allowing Africans to benefit more from mineral profits, this falls short of what is necessary for Africa to truly prosper from its mineral wealth. The underlying rationale of the race for battery metals is to ensure national prosperity domestically—not in Africa.

The ultimate goal of Africa’s economic development is the establishment of its own manufacturing base, potentially involving the compelled transfer of intellectual property so that companies not only extract and refine metals but also relocate the entire battery supply chain. However, this aspiration remains a distant prospect, particularly because manufacturing necessitates a reliable electricity supply, which is already a considerable challenge for countries like Congo.

Ultimately, the competition between Washington and Beijing for EV battery minerals obscures the profound and inherent divide not between China and the United States, but between the Global North and South. For the Global South to genuinely reap broad-based and comprehensive benefits from its extensive mineral wealth—resources that have become vital for climate policy—it would require such monumental shifts in global supply chains and economic relations that they are seldom even acknowledged.